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Abstract  
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) scholars and practitioners have expressed 
reservations about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle because of its popular 
use as a synonym for armed humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, R2P’s 
early failure to engage with and advance WPS efforts such as United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution 1325 (2000) has seen the perpetuation of limited roles 
ascribed to women in implementing the R2P principle.   As a result, there has been a 
knowledge and practice gap between the R2P and WPS agendas, despite the fact that 
their advocates share common goals in relation to the prevention of atrocities and 
protection of populations. In this article we propose to examine just one of the 
potential avenues for aligning the WPS agenda and R2P principle in a way that is 
beneficial to both and strengthens the pursuit of a shared goal – prevention.  We argue 
that the development of gender-specific indicators.– particularly economic, social and 
political discriminatory practices against women – has the potential to improve the 
capacity of early warning frameworks to forecast future mass atrocities. 
 
In 2005, the United Nations (UN) World Summit adopted the concept of the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) in paragraphs 138-140 of its outcome document (UN 
2005: paras.138-140). R2P’s roots lay in the repeated failure of the international 
community to prevent or halt genocides in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda during 
the 1990s (Ban 2010a: para.4). Informed by the earlier 2001 International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan’s In Larger Freedom report (2005) (ICISS 2001; 
Annan 2005), Member States formally accepted their enduring responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. They also agreed that the international community should assist states to 
this end and that when states failed to protect their populations, the international 
community had a responsibility to take ‘timely and decisive action’ to protect 
populations until the sovereign is able and willing to do so (UN 2005). Notably, states’                                                                                  1 The research in this paper was conducted as part of the activities of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect [DFAT Agreement 63684]. The Centre receives funding support from the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
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and the international community’s commitment to R2P included a specific 
commitment to prevent these four crimes. 
 
A notable, but often overlooked, consequence of the delineation of R2P in relation to 
the four crimes is that UN Member States effectively recognized that ‘sexual and 
gender-based violence is as worthy of international attention as other forms of 
violence’ (Bond and Sherret 2012: 144). It could be argued, of course, that sexual and 
gender-based violence had little need for such political elevation; a series of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions have linked women’s peace and security (WPS) 
to international peace and security since the landmark Resolution 1325 (2000) 
(S/Res/1325, 31 October 2000).i However, the inclusion of widespread and systematic 
sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) as acts of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide requires (ICC 2014: 10-16), we argue, that the prevention of 
these crimes be mainstreamed into R2P’s prevention agenda and, at the same time, 
R2P’s prevention agenda be mainstreamed into WPS. 
 
To date, as Bond and Sherret (2012: 141) note, there has been a failure to connect the 
R2P and WPS agendas. Many WPS scholars and practitioners are cautious about the 
R2P principle because of its popular expression as a synonym for armed humanitarian 
intervention and the lack of gender inclusivity in the original formulation of R2P 
under ICISS (Charlesworth 2010; Shepherd 2012). As a result, WPS advocates in the 
field have been wary of R2P and concerned about its potential effects on their work. 
As the UN Secretary-General has repeatedly explained, the popular representation of 
R2P as a contemporary euphemism for humanitarian intervention is inconsistent with 
what was agreed in 2005 and the UN’s implementation strategy (Ban 2009: para.10a; 
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also Ban 2010a, Ban 2011a, 2012a). On the other hand, R2P’s failure to engage with 
the protection and prevention agenda outlined within the WPS agenda (with exception 
of Ban 2009; Ban 2013) may also account for some of the caution of WPS advocates 
concerning R2P.  
 
The failure to connect the two agendas has prompted criticisms that R2P has failed to 
incorporate a gender perspective, and, in particular, the requirements of the WPS 
prevention, protection and participation agenda, as laid out in Resolution 1325 (2000) 
(Stamnes 2012: 176-177). Similarly, concerns have been expressed about the need to 
expand the gender-focused protection and participation aspects of Resolution 1325 
(2000) beyond the WPS community, in order to engage all actors and early warning 
mechanisms throughout the UN system (Skjelsbæk 2012: 162). Gaps and 
misperceptions have limited the exchange of knowledge between academics, policy-
makers and practitioners working in these two areas, despite the fact that they share 
common goals in relation to the prevention of mass atrocities and the protection of 
populations (George 2013). In this article we examine one potential avenue for 
connecting WPS and R2P in a way that is beneficial to both agendas and strengthens 
the shared pursuit of preventing mass atrocities in the first place: the development of 
gender-specific indicators in early warning frameworks to predict countries at risk of 
genocide and mass atrocities, specifically widespread and systematic sexual violence 
(Bond and Sherret 2012: 144). Like others, we are concerned that women-focused 
economic, social and political indicators remain relatively untested as factors that may 
inform conflict prevention and, of special interest to us, prevent mass atrocities 
(Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002; von Joeden-Forgey 2013; UN Women 2014).ii Our 
focus on female indicators does not mean that we exclude the existence of gendered 
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violence (sexual and gendered violence that targets both men and women), rather our 
particular focus is informed by earlier studies connecting gender norms 
(masculine/feminine social, economic and political roles) within a given society to 
women’s access to social, economic and political resources, to the occurrence of mass 
atrocities (Rehn and Sileaf 2002; Justino et al 2012; Skjelsbæk 2012). 
 
In this article, we argue for integration of gender-specific indicators into early 
warning frameworks for prevention of genocide and mass atrocities (which, in 
essence, indicates those countries at risk of failing to uphold their responsibility to 
protect) for two reasons.  First, if the best predictor of a country’s peacefulness is its 
level of violence against women - there should be efforts to analyze how women’s 
status in society relates to violence and, more generally, to the risk of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Hudson et al 2012). In 
particular, the inclusion of information about women’s human rights and violence 
against women into existing early warning frameworks should improve their capacity 
to predict not only widespread or systematic SGBV but also other atrocity crimes 
(Palermo and Peterman 2011; von Joeden-Forgey 2012). We argue that the WPS and 
R2P agendas can contribute to this goal, even more so when they align their focus on 
the value of gender specific early warning.   
 
Second, scholars have yet to consider the extent to which gender-specific indicators 
may be useful for predicting the R2P crimes (Davies and Teitt 2012). Currently, there 
is little evidence to support or reject the inclusion of gender-specific indicators to 
improve early warning of the R2P crimes in general, and widespread and systematic 
sexual violence more specifically. What is certain is that this lack of systemic analysis 
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has contributed to an inconsistent  – essentially ad hoc – approach to prevention of 
these crimes, and understanding of their relationship to other mass atrocity crimes 
(Palermo and Peterman 2011; Ban 2011b; Security Council Report 2012). When is 
sexual violence in conflict a weapon of war, or, additionally, also a tool of ethnic 
cleansing or political attack used prior to conflict to escalate tensions within society, 
or to forcibly displace and disempower (Buss 2009)? As things stand, the literature 
offers no clear answer to this question.  
 
The article proceeds in three parts.  First, we briefly chart the mass atrocity crimes 
listed under the R2P principle to examine how and where alignment with WPS may 
be valuable. We highlight, as one such area, the mandated requirement for the UN 
Secretary-General to present annual reports on situations of widespread and 
systematic sexual violence to the Security Council (Ban 2011b; Ban 2012b; 
S/Res/2106, 24 June 2013). In the second part of the article, we consider the added 
value of incorporating gender specific indicators to predict those countries where the 
risk of such atrocities is high.  We compare one suggested gender-focused early 
warning framework that relies on open source data (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002; 
Hill 2003) against two highly respected genocide and mass atrocities risk profiles – 
Gregory Stanton’s Genocide Watch and Barbara Harff’s Genocide Prevention 
Network (hereafter referred to as the ‘Genocide Watch’ and ‘Genocide Prevention’ 
lists) (Harff 2011; Genocide Watch 2012; see Butcher et al 2012). We consider the 
extent to which inclusion of gender specific indicators alters these general early 
warning lists. In the third, and final, part of the article we discuss our key findings. 
We find that gender specific indicators, especially those relating to women’s 
experience of social, economic and political inequality, are underutilized in early 
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warning frameworks for genocide and mass atrocities. We argue that the UN 
Secretary-General annual reports on situations of widespread and systematic sexual 
violence are an opportunity to promote dual WPS-R2P ambition of preventing such 
crimes through targeted prevention strategies at national, regional and international 
levels.  
 
Women, Peace and Security and the Responsibility to Protect 
At the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations General Assembly, under the R2P 
principle, states agreed never to commit four crimes: war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide. These crimes are commonly understood to 
reference the 1948 Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, 
and the 1998 Rome Statute, which provides the legal foundations for the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), operational since 2002 (O’Brien 2012). As such, the 2005 
summit document introduced clear parameters for the scope of R2P and the crimes to 
be prevented in order to protect civilians (Bellamy 2009: 75). As noted above, one of 
the consequences of the delineation of R2P in relation to these four crimes is that UN 
Member States have effectively recognized that ‘sexual and gender-based violence is 
as worthy of international attention as other forms of violence’ (Bond and Sherret 
2012: 144). This requires attention to detail on the preventative measures states must 
adopt to meet their responsibility to prevent these crimes, as well as to address how 
the international community may assist states with this obligation.  As noted in the 
UN Secretary-General’s fifth report on R2P, prevention requires addressing the 
relationship between gender inequality and atrocity crimes, specifically SGBV crimes 
(Ban 2013a: 7-8). This statement provides a political opportunity to outline a mutually 
reinforcing prevention agenda, by both R2P and WPS advocates. 
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As noted already in the introduction, one of the main sources of tension between the 
R2P and WPS agendas has been the prevailing view that R2P advocates are primarily 
concerned with armed humanitarian intervention (Charlesworth 2010). In this vein, 
some scholars have suggested that R2P reduces women to being victims that must 
wait to be ‘saved’ by armed (male) humanitarians and is thereby complicit in the risks 
faced by women by ignoring their agency and empowerment (Stamnes 2012). Such 
concerns about R2P are not unique to the WPS agenda. They have been echoed, for 
instance, in relation to R2P’s equally problematic relationship to the protection of 
civilians agenda (Strauss 2009: 48). However, as with its relationship with the 
protection of civilians, we suggest that R2P can serve as a mutually enforcing 
mechanism for these existing norms rather than challenge or undermine their 
existence.  
 
When it comes to the inclusion of WPS, the version of R2P that was adopted by 
Member States in 2005 is significantly more open to a prevention and protection 
agenda promoted by WPS than its earlier definitions. The 2001 ICISS report argued 
that sexual violence was worthy of international attention only when it was used for 
ethnic cleansing (ICISS 2001: xii, 15, 32), while the World Summit’s delineation of 
four crimes as being the subject matter of R2P allowed widespread and systematic 
SGBV to be considered an ‘R2P problem’ in its own right (i.e. not contingent on the 
crime being an act of ethnic cleansing).  What is more, R2P calls upon Member States 
to fulfill their legal obligations with respect to protecting populations from these 
crimes and demands that they receive international attention comparable to other 
forms of violence proscribed by the relevant laws. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
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moon, among others, has sought to counter the one-dimensional view of R2P and 
argues that the implementation strategy of R2P prioritizes prevention and early 
warning to prevent and deescalate crises – a pillar of prevention much in common 
with pillar of prevention articulated in Resolution 1325 (2000) (Ban 2009; Luck 2009: 
18). In his first R2P report, the Secretary-General referred to the responsibility of 
sovereigns to prevent mass atrocities, including sexual violence, by fulfilling their 
individual obligations to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 
Resolution 1612 (2005) and Resolution 1820 (2009) (Ban 2009: para.34). In his 2010 
report on R2P and early warning, the UN Secretary-General said that there was a gap 
in the process of accumulating and accessing data relating to the early warning 
indicators for conflict that specifically highlighted the risk of R2P crimes (Ban 2010a: 
para.10[b]).  The Secretary-General noted that R2P crimes do not only occur within 
contexts of armed conflict and, furthermore, these crimes were to be understood and 
recognised as possibly having different preconditions to generalized armed conflict.  
Though the linkage was not made that particular year (since 2009 R2P report, the first 
WPS reference has been in 2013 [Ban 2013a]), this argument was quite similar to one 
being presented by the Secretary-General in the same year concerning the need for 
greater emphasis on prevention in the WPS agenda, specifically, the prevention of 
widespread and systematic SGBV.  
 
In WPS Resolution 1960 (2010), the Security Council called for improved data 
collection specific to the risk of SGBV. The Secretary-General was called upon to 
identify, in his annual report pursuant to Resolution 1820 (2008), those parties 
engaged in conflict suspected of conducting acts of systematic sexual violence. In a 
departure from this reporting duty first outlined in Resolution 1820 (2008) and 
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Resolution 1888 (2009), Resolution 1960 (2010) suggested the Security Council use 
the Secretary-General’s annual report on situations of sexual violence in armed 
conflict as a means by which the Council would become more actively engaged in 
action to prevent these crimes (Security Council Report 2012: 15-16). The Security 
Council also called upon the Secretary-General to develop criteria for listing and de-
listing parties suspected of proscribed activities. The approach taken towards 
reporting situations of sexual violence in armed conflict, and the list of suspected 
parties, has been ad hoc and largely qualitative, drawing on information from gender 
advisors in peacekeeping operations, advice from UN Country Teams and the 
Secretary-General’s Special Representatives, the documentation and reporting of such 
crimes in individual country reports, information from the International Criminal 
Court, Human Rights Council, or Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
and other ad hoc sources.  There remain some deficiencies, not least the lack of 
transparency in the methods used to list and de-list and absence of clarity about how 
the UN system will address situations where the potential listing of government forces 
may cause political problems in situations where peacekeeping missions or Country 
Teams require the cooperation of the same government.  Nonetheless, the naming and 
shaming of such actors is an attempt to put pressure on them by ending the culture of 
impunity, and to improve the Council’s response to escalations by mobilizing and 
refining ongoing analysis both in the field and in New York (Security Council Report 
2012: 16). 
 
One of the principal reasons identified by the Security Council for the lack of 
progress on the prevention of SGBV, noted in Resolution 1960 (2010), has been the 
failure of Member States and UN offices to ‘cooperatively engage with…actors, 
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national institutions, civil society organizations, health-care service providers, and 
women’s groups to enhance data collection and analysis of incidents, trends, and 
patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence to assist the Council’s 
consideration of appropriate actions, including targeted and graduated measures’ 
(S/Res/1960: para.8). 
 
Accordingly, the Secretary-General was charged with establishing a ‘monitoring, 
analysis and reporting arrangement’ (MARA) to ‘name and shame’ perpetrators, as 
well as to precipitate the escalation of conflict-related sexual violence by reporting on 
situations of ‘armed conflict, post-conflict and other situations of relevance’ to the 
implementation of Resolution 1888 (2009).  Furthermore, Resolution 1960 (2010) 
called for the broadening to include specific gender indicators that could facilitate 
early warning for the prevention of these atrocities, in turn calling upon Member 
States to improve their data collection and analysis in these areas.  
 
The Security Council approved the creation of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
on Women, Peace and Security, tasked with creating a strategic framework that would 
guide the development of MARA. This has led to the establishment of a UN Matrix of 
Early Warning Indicators of Conflict Related Sexual Violence to guide the actions of 
the Security Council to prevent, halt and prosecute such crimes (Ban 2011b: paras.60-
63). As noted above, fulfillment of this framework requires Member States to provide 
data in relation to gender-specific indicators including specific acts of violence 
against women, implementation of international human rights law pertaining to 
gender equality, economic and social indicators for women and UN specific 
indicators (i.e. women in peacekeeping missions) (Ban 2010b: Annex).  These 
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indicators are intended to guide the development of a prevention framework that will 
inform the UN system, and specifically the offices under the Secretary General, on 
gender-focused risk analysis for the prevention of widespread and systematic SGBV. 
The UN has set the target of ensuring that half of its early warning systems (those 
tasked with responding to escalating events, i.e. the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the United Nations Department of Political 
Affairs and Office for Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA]) include gender-specific 
indicators by 2014, with gender-specific indicators being included as standard across 
all the system’s early warning analysis by 2020 (Ban 2011b: Annex). During this time, 
however, it appears there has been no discussion or even recognition of the shared 
interests in prevention and early warning between the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee on WPS and the Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect. This lack of engagement is problematic for the R2P agenda 
in light of repeated recommendations that there is a need to deepen the agenda’s 
understanding of gender-specific responses and recommendations to prevent mass 
atrocity crimes (Skjelsbæk 2012: 154-171). 
 
To date, there has been two references in the five UN Secretary-General reports on 
R2P (Ban 2009; Ban 2013b) to the need to direct more attention and research to 
record best practices in the alleviation of gender inequality and the promotion of 
gender empowerment to prevent mass atrocities, including SGBV crimes (The 
International Coalition for The Responsibility to Protect undated). However, beyond 
these suggestions, there has been little direction on how to start building such 
knowledge. Widespread and systematic SGBV is increasingly identified as a product 
of war (Taylor 2013), but the specific preconditions for SGBV and reasons why it is 
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prevalent in some armed conflicts but not others remain disputed (Wood 2009; Cohen 
2013). As we discuss below, the difficulties in collecting gender sensitive data (and 
the limited understanding of gender sensitive data) has led to their exclusion from 
early warning frameworks; thus the relationship between SGBV and mass atrocities, 
irrespective of the presence of conflict, is discussed but not presented as fact in these 
frameworks. 
 
In this section we have identified a particularly strong overlap between R2P and WPS 
to improve early warning assessments to prevent atrocities. However, as the recent 
UN Secretary General reports on sexual violence in armed conflict situations suggest, 
serious questions remain regarding the collection and interpretation of the relevant 
data.  Despite a shared interest in early warning frameworks and prevention toolkits to 
prevent mass atrocities, there has been little detail provided on how R2P and WPS 
could align their shared concerns to start generating the knowledge required to build 
political momentum towards prevention and early warning.  The first step is to 
evaluate the added value of including gender inequality in frameworks for predicting 
mass atrocities (Ban 2013b: 7-8), and it is this question that we turn to in the second 
part of the article. 
 
Gender-Specific Indicators and Early Warning 
In 2002, Suzanne Schmeidl and Eugenia Piza-Lopez noted that there were few, if any, 
early warning systems for conflict prediction, let alone genocide, that incorporated 
gender-specific indicators (Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez 2002: 8). Little has changed 
(Bond and Sherret 2012; von Joeden-Forgey 2012). Existing frameworks referred to 
for predicting mass atrocities and genocide do not refer to SGBV or gendered 
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indicators in their frameworks or policy planning (Harf 2003; Stanton 2004; Albright 
and Cohen 2008; Woocher 2011; Butcher et al 2012). Despite the fact that legal 
developments in relation to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity refer to 
gender-specific crimes – such as mass rape, forced sterilization and abortions, forced 
impregnation and forced marriage – two of the most highly sourced and respected 
annual risk analyses, those produced by Barbara Harff’s Genocide Prevention 
Advisory Network and Gregory Stanton’s Genocide Watch do not analyse gender-
specific indicators (Butcher et al 2012: 12).iii Nor does it appear that there has been 
consideration of whether a focus on such indicators or prior existence of widespread 
and systematic SGBV in a country may affect the country risk lists produced.  
 
One potential reason for the ‘gender silence’ in early warning analysis for mass 
atrocities may be that the primary focus to date has been on defining what is to be 
‘tested’ in these frameworks – ethnic and minorities versus the political-socio-
economic targeting – and what modeling provides best predictive capacity (Ulfelder 
2011). It seems that the gendered context and influences that informs who of the 
targeted groups is targeted for these crimes is not of consequence.  In addition, the 
concept of an early warning framework is still relatively new. Regarding early 
warning for widespread and systematic sexual violence, Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan came close to explicitly calling for such a framework in his 2006 violence 
against women report when he called on the Security Council to address ‘the 
responsibility of the State to address violence against women’, and recommended:  
The Security Council intensify efforts to address gender-based violence against 
women and consistently monitor measures taken within the framework of the 
implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and 
security. Towards this end, the Security Council should consider establishing a 
dedicated monitoring mechanism to increase the effectiveness of the Council’s 
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contribution to preventing and redressing violence against women in armed conflict 
(Annan 2006: para.397). 
 
However, it was not until Resolution 1960 (2010) that the Security Council started to 
identify the need to prevent violence against women through developing an early 
warning system (MARA), but the focus has been only on monitoring known 
perpetrators from committing further acts of sexual violence.  Thus all ‘early warning’ 
focus in MARA is on escalating acts of sexual violence and the perpetrators rather 
than the structural conditions that gave rise to such acts (i.e. an early warning 
framework that focuses on intervening variables that may prevent as well as predict). 
 
Another potential explanation for the silence could be that the need for gender-
focused early warning has received only sporadic interest from the Security Council 
and that this interest has been limited to its thematic agenda on WPS, particularly 
conflict-related sexual violence. In other words, there has been little cross-fertilization 
of WPS into other Security Council themes, missions and agendas (Aroussi 2011). 
This is particularly highlighted in discussions about sexual violence in the Security 
Council where there has been active political opposition to discussions of widespread 
and systematic sexual violence in conflicts that are not already on the agenda of the 
Security Council, despite precedents in other thematic areas, specifically in 
discussions of Children in Armed Conflict (Security Council Report 2012: 5). 
 
A recent examination of the Security Council’s progress on WPS since Resolution 
1325 (2000), conducted by the NGO Security Council Report, revealed key failings 
‘in terms of the continuing development of the Council’s response to sexual 
violence’: the lack of ‘reporting consistency between different country-specific 
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situations’ and failure to implement ongoing monitoring, analysis and reporting 
arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence.’ In other words, the relationship 
between political violence and sexual violence has not been understood as linked – 
this is a failure in early warning to prevent these crimes (Security Council Report 
2012: 2).  More careful thinking and analysis of gender-specific root causes may 
highlight where mass atrocities, including widespread and/or systematic SGBV, are 
likely to occur in situations of conflict, post-conflict and civil unrest (Ban 2012b: 
paras.1-4; UN Women 2014). This requires R2P and WPS advocates seeking each 
other out to outline a shared prevention focus. 
 
Early Warning and SGBV 
In light of the discussion above, this section explores the opportunities and challenges 
in relation to gender inequality in early warning frameworks for genocide and mass 
atrocities. Arguments for early warning frameworks to include gender-specific 
indicators have been raised by UN Women as recently as 2014 (UN Women 2014). 
As mentioned above, in the landmark exploratory study in the field, Schmeidl and 
Piza-Lopez (2002) examined the potential for gender-specific indicators to inform 
assessment of the underlying risk of genocide and mass atrocities (root cause 
indicators, i.e. political participation of women) in addition to developing their own 
framework for understanding the escalation of risk (precipitating indicators, i.e. high 
volume of female refugees fleeing conflict).  A series of UNIFEM-led studies used 
this model to explore the utility of local information gathering for early warning about 
escalating violence (i.e. identifying SGBV early to prevent it from becoming 
widespread and systematic) (Mosser 2007). This study interweaved generalized forms 
of violence against women (i.e. rates of domestic violence) with instances of 
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organized violence against groups of women (i.e. armed groups attacking villages and 
mass rape). 
 
In the rest of this section, we explore how contemporary application of these earlier 
studies relates to existing early warning frameworks for mass atrocities (R2P crimes).  
We compare the earlier mentioned and respected early warning risk lists - Genocide 
Watch and Genocide Prevention Network – and compare their 2012 risk lists against a 
2012 risk list developed from gender-specific indicators suggested by Schmeidl and 
Piza-Lopez (2002) (see Figure 1) as (equally) capable of identifying the risk of mass 
atrocities (see Table 1-3). 
 
Before moving on to comparing the datasets, it is important to clarify some potential 
problems in the analysis. First, gender focused data collection is relatively new.  The 
UNDP and the World Bank – primary sources of the data covered above – have only 
been collecting data with a ‘gender perspective’ in mind since early 1990s (i.e. 1994 
for UNDP). This means that data collection still relies heavily on self-reported 
surveys from Member States (the primary source for data collection on domestic and 
sexual violence). Such data is unlikely to be fine-tuned to the gendered implications 
of data collection in countries with high levels of inequality in their political, judicial 
and security sectors. For example, significant grievances may not be recorded when 
women lack access to the formal legal system (Ni Aolain, Haynes and Cahn 2011: 79). 
Second, there are methodological problems limiting the accuracy of data.  For 
example, data on female infanticide relies on estimates, often from case studies which 
are then extrapolated countrywide. The final challenge is the reliance on data 
produced over different timeframes and the problem with data collection irregularities. 
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For example, it is difficult to compare data on literacy rates with female attendance 
rates at primary or secondary school, because many states do not provide regular data 
on the latter.  If such data is to be used for early warning purposes, it must be 
collected regularly and as accurately as possible (Hudson et al 2012: 152-153).  
 
The definition of violence described by Secretary-General Annan in his landmark 
2006 report (see above) focuses on the systematic inequality and lack of 
empowerment that legitimates violence against women in the home and in society, 
and the possible overlap of this violence with conflict-related sexual violence.  Such 
‘very early’ early warning knowledge may be vital for understanding countries at risk 
of widespread and systematic SGBV but, equally, it may not be.  We attempted to 
incorporate these relevant claims by using a ‘wider’ set of gender-specific indicators 
in addition to the more limited set of indicators suggested by Schmeidl and Piza-
Lopez (2002).  
 
Our starting point was to look at the countries deemed at high risk of mass atrocities 
(R2P crimes) by Genocide Prevention and Genocide Watch lists. We then compiled a 
set of gender-specific root cause indicators to generate a gendered ‘preconditions’ list 
based on the indicators identified by Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Root causes for genocide early warning – gendered indicators 
**INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE **  
We soon encountered a number of problems in preparing data that replicated the 
Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez (2002: 9-11) framework. First, their suggested UNDP 
Gender Empowerment and Gender Development Index measures have evolved since 
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2011 into the Gender Inequality Indices (GII) in the UNDP annual report on human 
development indicators (HDI) (UNDP 2011). It is difficult to find data for some of the 
economic indicators, such as wage inequality, for many of the countries identified as 
being at high-risk according to the Genocide Watch and Genocide Prevention lists. 
The GII comprises most of the substantive political, economic and social measures 
that Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez (Figure 1 above) recommend. But, additional economic 
data and information about female suffrage and Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) coverage are not included in the GII.  We 
examined separately the relationship between GII rank, CEDAW adherence and 
female suffrage, as recommended by Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez (2002: 9-11). None of 
the (small number of) countries that have failed to ratify CEDAW correlated to 
countries with high GII scores (a high score for a country means their female citizens 
experience high levels of inequality). Likewise, given that female suffrage is now 
nearly universal – in principle at least – except in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, there 
appeared to be little use in applying a suffrage indicator (i.e. Htun and Weldon 2012). 
In other words, states that have signed to CEDAW but not ratified the instrument 
(Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Tonga and US) are small in number. This, 
combined with the absence of female suffrage (only Qatar and Saudi Arabia), 
indicates that such gender-specific data limited will not provide strong early warning 
indicators of mass atrocities and widespread and systematic sexual violence. 
 
This limited the socio-economic aspects of gender-specific indicators to the GII 
dataset (Klasen and Wink 2003). We identified three potential alternative composite 
gender indices: the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index (GGI), the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Economic Opportunity Index (WEOI), and the 
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OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI).  The GGI is a comprehensive 
annual economic survey but does not consider gender-specific indicators such as 
reproductive health, political empowerment and (unpaid) labour market participation.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (WEOI) 
would have been a useful alternative dataset, but it is not open source (authors did not 
have available funds to subscribe). The OECD SIGI released its second dataset (first 
was 2009) in May 2012.  This dataset covers non-OECD and non-EU countries that 
have populations over one million.  The focus is on developing countries undergoing 
rapid economic, social and political development.  There are 102 countries surveyed 
in SIGI, with full data available for 86 non-EU and non-OECD countries.  The values 
range from 0-1 with Argentina scoring the best SIGI at 0.0069 and Mali the worst at 
0.6011 (OECD 2012). The SIGI indicator range is much more extensive than GII, 
with fourteen variables in five categories (see below).  Indeed, SIGI attempts to cover 
the gender knowledge gaps identified by Schmeidl and Piza-Lopez (2002) concerning 
the inclusion of domestic/‘private life’ variables that affect women’s empowerment 
(Klasen and Wink 2003). As such, it includes variables that are often overlooked in 
other composite gender equality indices, including discriminatory family codes, 
restricted physical integrity, son bias (fertility preference towards boys and suspected 
practices of infant femicide), restricted resources and unique entitlements, and 
restricted civil liberties. The inclusion of SIGI indicators was an attempt to respond to 
critiques about the systematic (economic) bias against women’s lived experience in 
extant frameworks. 
 
As Table 1 shows, all datasets identify a common group of states, though the levels of 
risk they identify in each country are significantly different.   If we were to predict 
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those countries at highest risk of mass atrocities just by virtue of their gender 
inequality indices, we see that the GII and SIGI lists produce quite different rankings 
on this performance.   In examining Table 1, compare GII (greatest inequality to those 
that sit just above the ‘world average’ shaded according to 70% range; 60% range; 
50% range and 40% range), with the SIGI range (SIGI range is 0-1, all countries 
listed that performed worse than median performer – Myanmar, ranked 43rd with SIGI 
value 0.2405).  In comparing the GII and SIGI worst ten performing states, in terms 
of gender inequality, the two lists agreed on four states’ performance in this area, 
although it should be observed that GII did not report data for four of SIGI’s worst ten 
(Guinea, Nigeria, Somalia) and SIGI did not profile two of GII’s worst ten (Central 
African Republic, Papua New Guinea). Most significantly, in terms of data coverage 
– and ramifications for early warning – neither GII nor SIGI posted data (due to lack 
of consistent data) for six of the countries identified by the Secretary-General’s 
reports to the Security Council (2012) as having a high risk of SGBV (Ban 2012b). 
*** INSERT TABLE 1 HERE *** 
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Given disparities in the number of countries identified as ‘high risk’ in the 
frameworks, cognizant of the fact that policy-makers need to set priorities and 
allocate resources, we then reduced each list to (a maximum of) twenty-two countries.  
We compared situations of ‘high risk’ in the lists to see whether gender inequality 
provides early warning of countries at risk of atrocities, particularly sexual violence. 
*** INSERT TABLE 2 HERE *** 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ***   
This analysis produced mixed results, open, of course, to competing interpretations 
(see Table 3).  The central finding is that in relation to the specific risk of SGBV, 
none of the non-UN lists correlated closely with the places of concern identified by 
the Secretary-General in the same year (2012). Of course, the counter argument could 
be that these lists are not expected to correlate – but that is our point – they are not 
expected to correlate and this should be a concern for those interested in addressing 
high-risk situations of SGBV. 
 
The Genocide Watch list produced the highest replication (11 out of 22) with the UN 
Secretary-General’s list of countries at high risk of widespread SGBV, but this was 
still relatively low. The GII and SIGI fell short of the Genocide Watch list by three 
cases, though gaps between the datasets may explain the failure to list these cases.  
For example, GII did not provide data for Egypt, Guinea and Somalia, unlike 
Genocide Watch and SIGI. If we presume that the high SIGI rating for Egypt, 
Somalia and Guinea would have been replicated in the GII scores, then if we make 
the same presumption for the GII cases that SIGI did not include (Central African 
Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Kenya), then the GII list would be equal to 
Stanton and the SIGI list would be most correctly aligned with the Secretary-General 
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2012 list.  However, the assumption that GII would produce the same scores as SIGI 
for these countries could be queried given that GII and SIGI scores did not always 
correlate for the same country.  
 
Findings 
Do gender inequality lists demonstrate their early warning capacity for countries at 
risk of atrocities, particularly sexual violence, and do they have greater capacity to 
highlight risk than early warning lists that exclude gender indicators? As shown above, 
the results here are mixed.  GII and SIGI were able to produce lists that were 
comparable to the (most expansive) Genocide Watch early warning list and the UN 
Secretary General list on countries at risk of widespread sexual violence - even 
though the GII and SIGI use only socio-economic gender inequality indicators and no 
armed conflict indicators. However, none of these lists was accurate in identifying 
over 50% of the countries described as being at high risk of widespread and 
systematic SGBV by the Secretary-General.  But, the Secretary-General’s list is a 
political list and may not reflect all cases and all risks – as the significant differences 
between the 2012 list and recent 2013 list suggests (Ban 2012b; Ban 2013b). 
 
This preliminary research suggests that gender-specific indicators may be as useful as 
traditional non-gendered measures for early warning of imminent mass atrocities. 
Moreover, failure to consider systematic gender inequality and/or the systematic use 
of sexual violence as high-risk indicators needs to be reconsidered. Indeed, given the 
gaps in gender data which negatively impacted on the gender indices, it is possible 
that gendered indicators might outperform general early warning predecessors. In turn, 
these frameworks might be improved by including gender-specific indicators, 
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particularly when the focus is on predicting widespread and systematic sexual and 
gender-based violence. This underscores the importance of states implementing their 
commitment to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and strengthening their 
collection and publication of gender-focused indicators. 
 
A second finding is that the UN system has a solid understanding of high risk of 
sexual violence in situations of conflict, post-conflict and civil unrest even prior to the 
establishment of the 2014 Early Warning Matrix (Ban 2012b: Annex), but the list is 
political and vulnerable to exclusions that would not occur if weighed by evidence 
alone (Security Council Report 2013: 5). This poses the question of whether resources 
should be poured into refining analytical models before producing lists. While there is 
an urgent need to improve the quality and quantity of data relating to already 
established gender focused indicators, the evidence here suggests that there are real 
limits to what can be achieved with large-N risk assessments that are ultimately 
vulnerable to political decisions regarding who is listed and who is not.  Moreover, 
lists do not mitigate the need for ongoing system-wide collection and assessment of 
information from the field and its incorporation into policy-making.  
 
Our analysis suggests that gender inequality indices alone are as likely to identify risk 
of SGBV atrocities. This leads us to the view that related early warning frameworks 
must regularly engage with gender-specific indicators, Of course, attention to gender-
specific indicators is insufficient for effective early warning frameworks, but so too is 
it insufficient for gender-specific indicators to be continually excluded from these 
frameworks.  Cooperation between different agencies and mandates is required in 
order to use these frameworks to undertake preventative actions in high-risk situations. 
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At this stage, we argue, the logic for suggesting such analysis could be best promoted 
by the alignment of the R2P and WPS agendas.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It was right to argue in the past that R2P paid little attention to hard-won advances by 
WPS advocates in the three pillars of prevention, participation and protection.  While 
the two agendas remain distinct in terms of their definition and scope of their 
application, a shared interest in prevention of atrocities in the first place is an 
important cross-cutting theme. The risk, at present, is that both communities ignore 
potential complementarities stemming from this shared ambition, and thereby miss 
chances to bring interested and engaged partners together to promote the prevention 
of atrocities.  Without an alliance, evidence-gathering exercises and advocacy for 
preventative action will remain disjointed.  Moreover, connections from shared data, 
shared evidence and shared policy responses amongst the R2P and WPS communities 
could address, as we see above, the gaps in understanding the relationship between 
gender-based human rights abuses, gender inequality and the commission of mass 
atrocities.  
 
The obligation of states, as well as regional and international organizations, to fulfill 
their ‘responsibility to protect’ requires gendered participation in the prevention and 
mitigation of mass atrocities.  The main message from the R2P principle post-2005 
has been to advance efforts on the prevention of mass atrocities.  As Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon noted at the 2013 UN General Assembly Informal Interactive 
Dialogue on ‘The Responsibility to Protect – State Responsibility and Prevention’: 
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‘Let us…remember that the responsibility to protect seeks not only to protect 
populations at the eleventh hour but, first and foremost, to prevent crises from 
erupting at all’ (Ban 2013c). The WPS agenda has established an equally strong 
record in advocating for political will to address gender inequality as a conflict 
prevention measure.   
 
However, in the area of mass atrocities crimes – which can occur outside of the 
conflict environment – understanding how gender inequality heightens risk of these 
crimes and how to bring gender-based atrocity crimes to the attention of the UN 
Security Council has remained politically challenging.  The challenge is for the 
Security Council to agree to be briefed on SGBV atrocities outside of armed conflict, 
which will likely persist if gender inequality remains a relatively unacknowledged 
indicator of risk in early warning frameworks – as stated in the recent UN Secretary-
General’s report on R2P (Ban 2013b: 5, 7-8). Existing early warning frameworks 
have little ability to establish the relationship between gender inequality and the risk 
of mass atrocities that could have been of particular assistance in recent situations 
such as Mali, Syria and Central African Republic, where widespread and systematic 
targeting of women and men for sexual torture, rape and slavery was reportedly 
deployed against ethnic and political groups prior to the onset of these conflicts (Ban 
2012b). 
 
Therefore, we propose, as a first step that the WPS and R2P communities, primarily 
located in New York, should be brought together to discuss shared areas of focus and 
cases of mutual concern. This could be facilitated as a working group on women and 
R2P – a suggestion put forward by the International Coalition for the Responsibility 
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to Protect. There must also be deeper engagement with gender inequality, gendered 
discrimination and the role of the R2P principle in assisting states to address these 
human rights violations. It would be an important step forward for R2P friendly states 
to specifically address this issue at their annual Ministerial Meeting of the 
Responsibility to Protect, organized by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to 
Protect (Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, undated).  
 
The Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide and the Special Adviser for the Responsibility to Protect, to date, have not 
addressed the role of gender inequality and gendered violence in early warning 
frameworks.  It would be valuable for this Office to provide an exploratory paper on 
R2P and WPS that details the state, regional and international level responsibilities to 
address the relationship between gender inequality and human rights atrocities; deeper 
knowledge of this relationship is vital not just for the prevention of SGBV crimes but 
also for broader atrocities prevention measures, as noted in the 2013 UN Secretary-
General R2P report (Ban 2013b: 5).  
 
It is not enough to say R2P must have a gendered approach without the WPS 
community being engaged in the development of this approach. The WPS agenda has 
a long history at state, regional and international levels that will be valuable to the 
R2P community in progressing mutual agendas, particularly the prevention of mass 
atrocities. Conversely, the R2P community’s emphasis that addressing the conditions 
that lead to mass atrocity crimes, including widespread and systematic sexual 
violence, is the primary responsibility of states adds political and normative force to 
implement WPS commitments in at state, regional and international security 
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institutions to address structural gender inequality.  As this article has identified, there 
are presently few early warning frameworks to advise on a gendered approach to 
preventive diplomacy that is directed at the prevention of mass atrocity crimes.  
Engagement with this task alone, of mutual interest to WPS and R2P communities, 
would go a long way towards establishing a roadmap for states and the international 
community to uphold their responsibility to protect and women’s peace and security. 
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